Germany and France Face a Growing Russian Influence Challenge as Disinformation and Espionage Intensify

Germany and France are confronting a more sophisticated security environment in which traditional espionage is increasingly accompanied by cyberattacks, sabotage allegations, fabricated news, deepfakes and coordinated online influence operations.

However, describing either country as being “on the brink of being taken over by Russian spies” would overstate the evidence. Current reporting points instead to a persistent and evolving Russian influence threat that European governments and intelligence agencies are actively attempting to contain.

A Wider Form of Hybrid Warfare

The challenge facing Europe is no longer limited to conventional espionage.

European governments increasingly use the term hybrid warfare to describe combinations of cyber operations, intelligence activity, sabotage, information manipulation and the recruitment of local proxies.

France’s domestic intelligence chief recently warned that the country was facing a sharp increase in hybrid threats, including cyber intrusions and violence carried out through proxies. German officials have issued similar warnings about hostile activity directed at political, economic and critical infrastructure targets.

The European Union has also formally attributed a range of malicious cyber activities against European countries to Russia’s Federal Security Service and imposed sanctions on individuals and entities associated with those activities.

Germany Has Become a Major Target

Germany occupies a particularly important position in Russia’s European influence strategy because of its political weight, economic importance and central role in supporting Ukraine.

German security officials recently reported an escalation in Russian-backed disinformation campaigns ahead of regional elections. One campaign, known as Matryoshka, has used fabricated videos designed to resemble material from reputable broadcasters such as the BBC and German public broadcaster ARD.

The fake material has reportedly included allegations of corruption, sexual misconduct and other damaging accusations aimed at mainstream German politicians.

The objective is not necessarily to persuade every voter to support Russia. Instead, such operations can attempt to make citizens distrust politicians, journalists, elections and democratic institutions generally.

The Rise of Fake Media

One of the most effective techniques is to imitate trusted news organizations.

Instead of publishing an obviously Russian-looking propaganda website, influence operators can create a fake video or webpage carrying the branding of a respected European media organization.

A viewer encountering such material on social media may initially assume that the information has been independently reported by a familiar news outlet.

Researchers tracking Russian influence operations have documented this tactic in both Germany and France. The campaigns have used fabricated websites, artificial intelligence, fake documents, manipulated audio and impersonated media brands.

France Faces Similar Pressure

France has also become a major target of Russian influence operations, particularly as the country prepares for its 2027 presidential election.

Several French political figures have recently said they were targeted by Russian-linked disinformation campaigns involving fabricated allegations and deepfake material. French authorities have been monitoring networks including Storm-1516 and Matryoshka.

The campaigns have attempted to exploit controversial political subjects and personal scandals because emotionally charged claims are more likely to attract attention online.

But an important qualification is necessary: researchers have found that many of these crude operations receive little genuine engagement. Their ability to create large amounts of misleading content does not automatically translate into the ability to control public opinion.

From Troll Farms to AI-Enabled Influence

The modern information battlefield is also becoming cheaper and faster.

Artificial intelligence can help influence operators produce large quantities of text, images, audio and video in multiple languages.

In one recently reported operation, Russian operators allegedly used AI tools to produce multilingual propaganda in English, French and German. The campaign also promoted a fictitious think tank designed to appear legitimate while pushing narratives favorable to Moscow.

This development lowers the cost of influence operations.

A relatively small group can potentially create material that looks professional enough to circulate through social-media networks, where human users and political influencers may unknowingly amplify it.

The Role of Pro-Russian Influencers

Social-media personalities can become an important part of this ecosystem without necessarily being direct Russian agents.

Some accounts knowingly promote Kremlin-friendly narratives. Others may simply share sensational claims because they attract attention. Still others can become unwitting distributors of material originally created by foreign influence networks.

Recent reporting on Germany has described attempts to use English-language content to reach MAGA-aligned audiences in the United States, with the expectation that American social-media users would subsequently amplify narratives relevant to German politics.

That illustrates how modern influence operations can cross national borders before reaching their intended audience.

Espionage Remains a Serious Concern

Information warfare is only one component of the broader threat.

France officially attributed years of cyber espionage against French government and strategic interests to a unit of Russia’s FSB. French authorities said Russian-linked operations had targeted military-related email accounts, diplomatic networks and a research organization working with sensitive defence technologies.

The European Union has similarly reported Russian cyber activity against government networks and critical infrastructure in several member states, including France and Germany.

France has also investigated suspected Russian-linked sabotage activity on its territory.

Germany Is Strengthening Its Intelligence Capabilities

Berlin is responding to the changing security environment.

In August, Germany’s cabinet approved draft legislation designed to strengthen the capabilities of the country’s foreign and domestic intelligence services. The proposed changes include expanded technological capabilities and powers intended to help authorities respond to hostile foreign operations.

The debate reflects a difficult balance.

European governments want stronger intelligence capabilities, but democratic societies must also protect privacy, civil liberties and freedom of expression.

Countering foreign interference cannot mean treating every pro-Russian opinion as an intelligence operation.

The Home Front Matters

The broader strategic issue is important for Europe.

European governments are providing substantial political, financial and military support to Ukraine. If Russia can weaken that support by creating political divisions inside European countries, it can potentially achieve strategic objectives without confronting NATO militarily.

That is why European officials increasingly describe information security and democratic resilience as part of national security.

The goal is not to eliminate unpopular opinions. It is to identify coordinated foreign manipulation, expose fabricated information and prevent hostile intelligence networks from exploiting democratic institutions.

Why Democratic Resilience Is the Strongest Defense

The most effective response may not be censorship or blanket restrictions.

Instead, governments and technology companies can strengthen:

• Independent fact-checking
• Media literacy
• Election-security systems
• Cybersecurity
• Intelligence cooperation
• Transparency around political advertising
• Rapid identification of deepfakes
• Protection of journalists and political candidates
• Public awareness of foreign influence techniques

France and Germany are already cooperating with European partners on these issues, while EU institutions are imposing sanctions and publicly attributing certain Russian cyber activities.

A Battle for Trust

The most valuable target for a foreign influence operation may not be a government database or military facility. It can be public trust itself.

If citizens stop believing journalists, elections, courts, politicians and even basic facts, democratic institutions become harder to operate.

That is why the growing Russian influence threat facing Germany and France should be understood as a challenge to resilience rather than evidence that either country is about to be “taken over.”

Russia has demonstrated an ability to conduct persistent espionage, cyber operations and information campaigns across Europe. At the same time, the evidence also shows that many influence campaigns have limited direct reach and that European institutions are actively detecting and responding to them.

The struggle over Europe’s information environment is therefore likely to continue.

For Germany and France, protecting the home front will increasingly mean protecting not only borders and infrastructure, but also the integrity of information, elections and public debate.